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R

ecent experience suggests that h umanitarian assistance and disaster relief
operations are a growth industry for military forces. In the last 12 months
alone, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) has provided emergency aid to victims
of the Pakistan earthquake; the Indian Ocean tsunami; the Nias, Indonesia earthquake (in which nine AOF personnel died in a helicopter crash); and Cyclone
Larry, a category 5 tropical cyclone that tore across the north Q ueensland coastline
of Australia in early 2006.
Figures from the World Health O rganization's Centre for Research on Epidemiology of Disasters show that from 1990 to 2003 there was a 180% increase in the
n umber of people affected by natural disasters: 255 million people in 2003 up from
90 million in 1990. 1 Between 1990 and 2000 in Asia alone there were 215 so-called
"non-complex" relief operations (floods, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, etc.,
where host nations were the primary responders).2 Operation Shaddock, fo r
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example, saw the ADF come to the aid of Papua New Guinea following a tsunami
on July 17, 1998 that killed over 3,000 people.
Complex relief operations, on the other hand, involve the delivery of human itarian assistance to societies riven by warring factions, civil disorder or population
displacement, any or all of which problems might be compounded by the misery of
a natural disaster. One example is the multinational force led by the ADF to render
humanitarian aid, provide security and instill the rule of law in guiding TimorLeste to become the first new nation of the twenty-first century.
However one might categorize emergency relief operations, it is traditionally
the case that military forces are called upon to provide the humanitarian or disaster
aid required often with little, or indeed no, notice. Military forces have the resources at hand to quickly reach inaccessible places. But increasingly, some nongovernment organizations (NGOs) rival the capacity of military forces to transport
large volumes of supplies in relief operations. The Brookings Institution cites a case
in point: "During the highly visible airlift of food into Afghanistan during the winter of 200 1--02, the U.S. military delivered only a tiny fraction of the total brought
in through conventional operations by WFP [World Food Program] and NGOs
like IRe [International Red Cross] ."} Not only do such NGOs have the capacity to
deliver aid where required-they can do it cheaper than military forces.
Perhaps relief operations should be left to specialist NGOs. This is the preference of some NGOs, such as Medecins Sans Frontieres, who seek to provide aid relief unencumbered by politics and military association. This would permit military
forces to maintain their focus on their core function of warfighting. Military forces
usually are only too pleased to hand over the reins of relief operations as soon as
practicable to NGOs or UN agencies. For some time the United States has been uneasy about the resources of its armed forces being diverted from its core function,
as noted by the US Congressional Research Service (CRS):
For over a decade, some Members of Congress have expressed reservations about U.S.
military involvement in peacekeeping. The Bush Administration's decision to reduce
the commitment of U.S. troops to international peacekeeping seems to reflect a majo r
concern: that peacekeeping duties [defined by the CRS to include "providing security
for hwnanitarian relief efforts"] are detrimental to military "readiness," i.e., the ability
of U.S. troops to defend the nation.4

Certainly there is no shortage ofNGOs around the world ready and willing to assist
in relief operations. It is estimated that within three weeks of the 2004 Boxing Day
tsunami in Southeast Asia there were over 109 NGOs operating in Indonesia, 84 in
Sri Lanka and 35 in Thailand .s
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The fact remains, of course, that military forces are indispensable for relief operations in hostile or uncertain security environments. Moreover, despite the capacityofNGOs for economical long-term lease of aircraft in relief operations, military
forces are unmatched in their ability to ra pidly deliver aid to remote places, particularly in the maritime environment. The day after the 2004 tsunami, Australian
soldiers departed for Sumatra and within a week had established a water purification plant in Banda Aceh. Military forces have the capacity to bring instantaneous
infrastructure to a devastated area. As simply stated in Royal Australian Navy doctrine: "Naval forces are self-supporting and do not create logistic burdens in situations where infrastructure has been destroyed or severely damaged. " 6
The NATO Review neatly assessed the military contribution to relief operations
in these terms:
The recent disasters in the United States and Pakistan have highlighted how useful
certain military capabilities can be when first responders find themselves
overwhelmed. Strategic airlift is crucial to transport urgently needed relief supplies as
commercial aircraft are not always available in sufficient numbers. Moreover,
helicopters have proven essential in the first phase of a disaster-relief operation when
roads are often too badly damaged to be passable and sealift capabilities are critical to
sustaining the relief effort in a more cost-effective way in the weeks and months
following a disaster. Rapidly deployable military hospitals and medical personnel can
also help out overburdened first responders. In addition, military engineers. water
purification units and search-and-rescue teams all have the skills that can greatly
improve crisis-response capabilities and save lives.'
Whether wrought by climate change or happenstance, the world has recently
witnessed a succession of natural disasters of such scale as to pose transnational
challenges that require international cooperation and understanding. This need
was dearly evident in the most devastating of these disasters, the Indian Ocean tsunami of Boxing Day 2004.8 The tsunami was triggered by an enormous undersea
earthquake (9.3 on the Richter scale) that ruptured the earth's crust for over 1,000
kilometers, releasing tremendous energy. This, the second most powerful earthquake ever recorded,9 generated a tsunami whose destruction in the immediate region was shocking, and a global tragedy.
What frameworks exist fo r civilian-military and international cooperation in relief operations? On December 19, 1991, UN General Assembly Resolution 46/18210
created the Department of Humanitarian Affairs, designed to strengthen the coordination of humanitarian emergency assistance. The resolution outlined 30 guiding
principles "in accordance with the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality"11 for the provision of relief aid. It reaffirmed the primary responsibility of States
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to care for the victims of natural disasters within their borders but asserted that
"the United Nations has a central and unique role to play in providing leadership
and coordinating the efforts of the international community to support the affected countries." 12 The resolution makes it dear that coordination is the key tool
in humanitarian operations.
The UN Charter makes no specific reference to the use of military fo rces in humanitarian operations. There is an inherent tension between the roles of civilian
agencies and military forces in relief operations. This was evident, for example, in
1994 during Operation Restore Hope in which US military and international civilian aid agencies worked through a Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) to
overcome their "cultural differences" for the common good of Rwandan refugees
in Zaire. 13
In a perfect world there should naturally be complementarity between military
forces and NGOs in relief operations. The Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols l4 refer to impartial relief societies concerned with the provision of
humanitarian aid and the protection of relief agency personnel. Surely this provides common ground with military forces whose duty it is to protect civilians under the law of armed conflict.
In 1994 the Oslo Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in
Disaster Relief1' were adopted by various nations to provide effective interaction of
military and civilian actors in disaster relief operations. In subsequent years, the
Oslo Guidelines were developed by the UN's Office for the Coordination of H umanitarian Affairs (OCHA}.Aftera review of a number of operations, OCHAconceded that in a range of international relief operations:
[TJhe coordination between the international military forces and the responding UN
humanitarian agencies and other international civilian actors has been critically
examined by a nwnber of participants and observers and found to be in need of
improvement. The success that was achieved in the use of military resources and
coordination was due largely to the extraordinary efforts of the personnel in the field .16
Also in 1994, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement published its Code of Conduct for disaster relief operations. I? This code stipulates ten
principles fo unded upon the need for impartiality-that aid should be given on the
basis of and in proportion to need alone.
The conduct of civil-military relief operations requires impartiality and cooperation but also cultural sensitivity and political sagacity. This was evident no more
so than in the international relief operation in the wake of the 2004 Boxing Day
tsunami.
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About 250 kilometers from the epicenter of the earthquake, Aceh suffered the
full brunt of the tsunami's force. This was a catastrophe in one of the most isolated and politically charged areas of Southeast Asia and a source of political instability for more than a century. IS Before the arrival of international aid workers,
the Indonesian government had quarantined Aceh. Indonesian forces regularly
dashed with the Free Aceh Movement, or GAM, rebels. The local population is as
devoutly Muslim as anywhere in the world and Sharia law is in force. For nearly
three decades, Aceh was embattled, silent and dosed off from the outside world.
The earthquake and tsunami left survivors devastated and prey to the entreaties
of al-Qaida and Jamah Islamia, whose members, undoubtedly, were gathering to
hand.
The first foreigners on the scene and with the greatest lift capacity were forces
from Australia, Singapore and the United States. Troops were unarmed and relied
upon Indonesian security to conduct relief operations. As an Indonesian commander remarked, "If you want to carry a weapon, you'd better choose a side."
During the three months that the ADF conducted relief operations in Aceh, some
200 people were killed in skinnishes between GAM and Indonesian forces.
It was into this situation that thousands of troops and hundreds of civilian relief workers descended. While foreign forces and NGOs scurried to organize
themselves, stoic Indonesian soldiers set about the grimmest of tasks, tirelessly
clearing waste and debris and disposing of the dead in accordance with local practice. Many of these soldiers had themselves lost loved ones. Many had no family or
homes to which to return. When the tsunami struck, Indonesian troops were conducting an amphibious landing exercise. All those soldiers perished, along with
some 1,000 of their comrades at their headquarters at Banda Aceh. Offshore the
USS Bonhomme Richard Expeditionary Strike Group and USS Abraham Lincoln
provided considerable muscle and heavy lift. US Navy aviation assets were crucial
to the aid effort.
The ADF's primary concern was to ensure that the relief effort was in accordance with Indonesian priorities. The view that Indonesians knew best what Indonesians required was a fundamental precept of Australian, Singaporean and
American forces . Through the Civil-Military Aid Coordination Conference
(CMAC) this view was shared by other foreign forces and the majority ofNGOs.
The CMAC met daily in Medan, the transport hub of northern Swnatra. An Indonesian colonel, with an Australian lieutenant colonel as deputy, chaired the meetings. The CMAC was the principal means of sharing information about the
progress of the mission, road conditions, security concerns, aid priorities, bottlenecks and expectations.
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Expectation management was a prime concern for the CMAC. The thousands
of military and civilian aid workers who descended upon Indonesia burned with
the desire to help. The mood was reflected by Dr. Fiona Terry, founder of the Australian section of Medecins Sat/s Frot/heres: "Humanitarian action is more than a
technical exercise at nourishing or healing a population defined as in need; it is a
moral endeavor based on solidarity with other members ofhumanity."19 The role
of the CMAC (and its Secretariat comprised initially of ADF, Singaporean and US
officers, with representatives of the Australian Government Aid Program
(AUSAlD), the US Agency for International Development (USAlD) and the UN
Joint Logistic Centre (UNJLC)) was to manage the prosaic but crucial tasks of setting priorities, allocating scarce air assets and ensuring that relief supplies were efficientlyand effectively distributed.
In those early weeks of the operation, certain misconceptions about the needs of
Aceh proved difficult to dispeL It fairly quickly became evident that the survivors
suffered relatively few serious injuries and that there were sufficient medical staff
and equipment for their needs. It proved challenging to stem the tide of doctors
and nurses to the region. The real needs were engineers for reconstruction, environmental health officers to counter disease and qualified NGOs to manage the
camps of displaced persons.
A considerable amount of aid donated from around the world was undoubtedly
well intended but misguided. The warehouses in Medan were brimming with
sweaters, Western-style tinned baby food, hillocks of canned baked beans, crates of
boiled fruitcake and mounds of precooked meals for which the people of tropical
Aceh had neither the need nor the appetite. Truckloads of disposable diapers were
a mystery to these people and contributed yet more waste in a region blanketed in
litter. The pressing need was, in fact, for dried fish , rice noodles, powdered milk
and cloth diapers.20
The best NGOs were informed, organized and relatively self-sufficient. In particular, the International Organization for Migration (lOM) had vehicles and was
well organized. The World Food Program (WFP) had aircraft and their own temporary accommodation. The Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and
Medecins Sans Frot/tieres were experienced, politically informed and focused on
finding solutions, and Caritas efficiently directed its energies to pastoral care.
The NGOs who experienced the most frustration and were perhaps less effective
were those who were impractical, ignorant of Shari a law, failed to calibrate security
concerns into their plans, complained that the Indonesian government did not understand them and failed to appreciate that a humanitarian disaster must be addressed in its context. Some NGOs, in their callow enthusiasm, failed to appreciate
that the consent of any nation to welcome large and diverse numbers of

272

Evan Carlin
international military and civilian relief workers is rarely unconditional and openended. The most egregious error by a few naive aid workers was to unilaterally set
offfor Aceh by road through Sumatran jungles only to breakdown and themselves
become "secondary victims" of the disaster requiring assistance.
The most effective NGOs were not necessarily the large, established organizations. A capable group of well-connected volunteers fro m a Sydney suburban
council proved effective. Surfers Without Borders diligently hired boats and accessed the otherwise inaccessible parts of western Sumatra to paddle ashore with
supplies. And , improbably, Save the Sumatran Orangutans delighted the CMAC
by arriving with a sumptuous swag of donations to put to good use-for humans.
The ADF completed its mission in Aceh in three months. "Completed," of
course, is a relative term. The measure of success in relief operations is a matter of
delivering the greatest good in the time available. The CMAC worked efficiently,
certainly diligently, and aid was directed purposefully and quickly. It proved an effective mechanism, as OCHA describes, for bridging the "humanitarian gap between the disaster needs that the relief community is being asked to satisfy and the
resources available to meet them."21
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